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I am most grateful to Captain Jack Grunawalt for inviting me to participate in this Symposium on the Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict 
and other Military Operations. The organizers deserve special thanks for bringing 
together military and civilian experts on international environmental law and the 
law of war for a discussion of a most important, interesting and timely subject. 
Meetings and dialogue of this kind between military and academic lawyers is 
something that I would like to see more often in the future; academics are often 
unaware of the important work that is done by military lawyers. The papers 
presented to our Panel by Admiral Robertson and Colonel Burger exemplify 
careful research and analysis. Both authors detail constructive, reflective and fresh 
approaches, which, in my experience, one often finds among military lawyers. 
In assessing protection of the environment in non-international armed 
conflicts, one must keep in mind certain considerations. First, to be effective, 
protection of the environment must be continuous and ongoing. It cannot be 
contingent upon whether there is a state of peace, international war or civil war. 
It is encouraging that there is an emerging consensus that acts prohibited in 
international wars should not be tolerated in civil wars. 
Second, instruments protecting the environment during non-international 
armed conflicts are considerably weaker than those applicable to international 
wars. The reason for such weakness is not merely technical. It reflects the 
reluctance of States to recognize international constraints on the conduct of civil 
war on their national territories. 
The sovereignty of States and their traditional insistence on maintaining 
maximum discretion in dealing with those who threaten their sovereign authority 
have combined to limit the reach of the law of war to non-international armed 
conflicts. Treaty language such as that in Common Article 3(2) to the Geneva 
Conventions, explicitly stating that certain rules will not affect the legal status of 
the parties, has not proved to be sufficiently reassuring for governments concerned 
with legal recognition and political status of rebel groups. 
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The critical stakes involved in internal conflicts, namely, survival of authorities 
in power, partition of territory, movements of populations, the challenge of 
identifying the actors responsible for egregious acts of environmental damage, 
imputability and responsibility issues, all add to the formidable difficulties 
confronting the international community in trying to improve the protection of 
the environment in civil wars. How to bind insurgents to emerging international 
rules that protect the environment also represents a major problem for the 
international community. 
Of course, quite a few of the present difficulties could be resolved, or at least 
attenuated, through good faith respect for already existing principles. It is possible 
that most attacks on the environment in internal conflicts would have occurred 
whatever the normative provisions. But the normative weakness plays into the 
hands of those who tend to pay little respect for environmental protection to begin 
with. 
There has nevertheless emerged an encouraging, though still tentative, trend 
towards the extension of some law of war treaties, and some arms control treaties 
of major environmental importance, to non-international armed conflicts. 
Consider, for example, the applicability to civil wars of parts of the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, the applicability in all circumstances of obligations of States under the 
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and on their 
DestrUction, and under the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
DestrUction; and most recently, the proposals before the Review Conference of 
the States Parties to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons to extend the prohibitions of Protocol II 
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) to 
non-international armed conflicts. 
Although I share Conrad Harper's and John McNeill's skepticism about 
prospects for a major expansion by treaty of environmental protection in time of 
war (at the present time, a diplomatic conference is unlikely to agree to a high 
common denominator), I would not rule out the possibility of further modest, 
focused expansion by treaty of environmental protections to non-international 
armed conflicts. 
Moreover, as already noted in the papers presented to our panel, the ENMOD 
Treaty is applicable in all circumstances. The problem with many environmental 
treaties, however, is that they are silent as to their continued applicability in armed 
conflicts. Some environmental treaties, such as those protecting endangered 
species, their habitats and other particularly vulnerable environmental assets, 
would not serve a useful purpose unless construed to apply in all situations. 
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In the ICRC Committee of Experts on the Environment and the Law a 
suggestion was made to srody all the major environmental treaties with a view to 
ascertaining whether they were intended to continue to apply in time of war, 
including civil war. That suggestion does not appear to have been followed. Furore 
treaties should, whenever possible, contain explicit language ensuring their 
applicability in time of war, including non-international armed conflicts. 
The difficulty in classifying conflicts as either international or internal provides 
an additional argument for applying to civil wars the broader protective rules 
applicable in international armed conflicts. Colonel Burger, for example, treats the 
conflict in the former-Yugoslavia as non-international, although the Security 
Council appears to regard the conflict as international and the United States in its 
amicus brief submitted to the criminal tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia strongly 
argues that the conflict is one of an international character. 
In attempting to enhance the protection of the environment during 
non-international armed conflict, there are several approaches which are not 
mutually exclusive. I already mentioned the treaty-making or law-making approach, 
which while useful in specific areas, does not promise a real panacea, at least in the 
present circumstances. In any event, Professor Oxman's suggestion that additional 
treaty protection could be created for objects of special environmental importance 
deserves careful consideration. 
Second, the strenthening of the national environmental peace-time policy approach. 
Strengthening national environmental law, policy and education during periods 
of peace may in practice contribute to de-legitimizing environmentally disastrous 
conduct by government and rebel forces as they battle for the hearts and minds of 
the people. 
Third, the interpretative approach, i.e., wherever possible construing those 
environmental treaties which are silent on applicability in time of war as 
continuing in effect during non-international armed conflicts. As the ICRC 1993 
report to the U.N.G.A. noted, "Rules of general or bilateral international treaties 
remain applicable in principle to a State in which there is an internal conflict." Of 
course, absent international war, there is no justification for suspending 
environmental treaties on grounds of war with foreign countries. There remains 
the possibility, however, of a State trying to suspend such treaties on grounds of 
national emergency, necessity orforce majeure. Other States should be skeptical of 
such justifications for treaty suspension. Ideally, of course, environmental treaties 
should provide for non-derogability or at least as narrow derogability as possible. 
Fourth, the human rights connection. As we all know, there is an important school 
of thought linking protection of the environment in time of war, including civil 
war, with protection of human rights. The recent decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain has given new vitality to the 
human rights dimension of environmental protections. Of course, respect of 
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human rights has always suffered from claims of derogability on grounds of 
national emergency. 
Fifth, the customary law strategy. I refer here to the Martens Clause which 
encapsulates the reservoir of general principles and customary law which serve to 
limit the discretion of military commanders and suggest that military 
commanders select those tactical solutions that are most beneficial to the 
protection of the environment. This would include also such general law of war 
principles as proportionality and the prohibition of causing unnecessary damage 
or wanton destruction, and outside of the law of war, some principles of State 
responsibility. Some relevant environmental standards may already be part of 
customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts 
without being encompassed in the present, standard interpretations of the Martens 
Clause. Perhaps the most important challenge is to recognize that these principles, 
rooted in the Hague law, have an undeniable place in internal conflicts. Because 
of the high threshold of the environmental provisions contained in Additional 
Protocol I, their usefulness even for international armed conflicts is limited. The 
customary law principles stated in the Hague Convention No. IV on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (1907) are, therefore, particularly important. 
Sixth, establishment of model rules and model agreements. I refer here to the 
development of a model set of essential standards for the protection of the 
environment in non-international armed conflicts to be followed by parties to 
internal conflicts. Compliance would be encouraged through strong international 
pressure. In appropriate circumstances, such model rules might be transformed 
into agreements to be accepted by conflicting parties. In drafting the model rules 
and model agreements, efforts should be made toward greater integration of 
environmental and law of war standards. This could lead to a more significant 
emphasis in the law of war on such fundamental environmental concerns as the 
precautionary principle and respect for furore generations. This should also be 
relevant to the drafting of rules of engagement, military manuals and training 
methods. 
Seventh, mechanisms should be set in place for ensuring respect for the existing 
principles-imaginative consideration should be given to the possibility of more 
efficient scrutiny and monitoring of violations. Such mechanisms could include, 
as already suggested by John McNeill: (1) requiring violators of existing principles 
to pay compensation, and (2) prosecuting such violators as war criminals. I would 
add that such prosecutions should be contemplated only where the existing 
customary law is sufficiently established to overcome possible ex post facto 
challenges. One would have to be cautious about the applicability of simple 
compensatory models in the present state of international law on the environment 
and war. 
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Problems about the roles of international institutions in non-international 
armed conflicts are legion, but environmental protection raises further questions. 
Special expertise is needed in relation to environmental issues if international 
institutions are to contribute to monitoring, assessment, and protective measures. 
Some environmental capacity-building is desirable in the OSeE, Western 
European Union, the United Nations and NATO, especially where they deploy 
fact finders, observers, or military units. Technical environmental assistance to 
States involved in internal conflicts may also play a role in helping promote 
observance of the law of war. Again, this raises questions of environmental 
consciousness and environmental expertise of military trainers and foreign 
military advisers. 
Eighth, and most important, the pragmatic-expansive approach-here I address 
the readiness to apply to non-international armed conflicts the broader and more 
protective rules applicable to international armed conflicts. This approach is 
exemplified by the paper by Admiral Harlow, who speaks of the duty of States 
involved in combat operations to act, in military operations other than war, within 
the constraints of the law of armed conflict. 
Even more explicitly, Colonel Burger pleads with regard to the conflict in the 
former-Yugoslavia for respect by U.N. peace-keeping forces and NATO forces for 
the more extensive environmental protections stated in Additional Protocol I. He 
notes that the rules of engagement being used by peace-keeping forces in 
former-Yugoslavia and the rules proposed for NATO forces acting in support of 
the United Nations, "Do not make a distinction between international and 
non-international conflicts" and that any peacekeeping force would follow the 
environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I "no matter how we classify the 
conflict." The application of such higher standards, he suggests, would apply not 
only to non-international armed conflicts but also more broadly to all military 
operations other than war. 
I believe that the incorporation of environmental protections rules of 
engagement offers a very attractive strategy, as does the inclusion in military 
manuals of environmental rules which follow, for all armed conflicts, the most 
protective rules. In addition, the anthropocentric provisions of Additional 
Protocol II (Articles 14-15) could be broadly interpreted to provide more direct 
protection to environmental assets. 
Most important is the emerging readiness to factor environmental concerns 
into the calculus of the military commander and, at least as the United States policy 
is concerned, to apply the more broadly protective rules pertinent to international 
armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts as well. Thus, the 
authoritative Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [NWP 9 
(Rev. A), at 6.1.2.] clearly states: 
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The obligations of the United States under the law of armed conflict are observed 
and enforced by the U.S. Navy in the conduct of military operations and related 
activities in armed conflict, regardless of how such conflicts are characterized. 
The 1995 revised edition of this Handbook follows the same approach: "[i]n 
those circumstances when international armed conflict does not exist (e.g., internal 
armed conflicts), law of armed conflict principles may nevertheless be applied as 
a matter of policy" [NWP I-14M at 6.1.2]. Although the U.S. position on this issue 
is ahead of the views of most States, it is not unique. Thus, the German 
Humanitarian Law Manual [DSK VV 207320067 at para. 211] states that "German 
soldiers, like their Allies are required to comply with the rules of international 
humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations in all armed conflicts 
however such conflicts are characterized." 
None of the above approaches offers a definite or comprehensive solution. 
Taken together, they suggest useful strategies for more effective protection of the 
environment during non-international armed conflicts, and serve to facilitate the 
development of international law, conventional and customary, in this area of 
growing concern. 
*Professor ofIntemational Law, New York University School of Law. 
